












Cesar L. Escalante, University of Georgia 
 
James E. Epperson, University of Georgia 
 
Forrest E. Stegelin, University of Georgia 
 




Date of Publication:  May 10,2005 
 
Selected Paper, 2005 Annual Meetings of  
the American Agricultural Economics Association, Providence, RI, July 24-27, 2005. 
 
Corresponding author:   Cesar L. Escalante 
        Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
University of Georgia, 315 Conner Hall, Athens, GA 30606 




Copyright 2005 by Cesar L. Escalante, James E. Epperson, Forrest E. Stegelin,  and Rodney 
Brooks.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies 
   1




A binomial logistic framework is used to determine important linkages between the FSA’s decision 
on each loan application and the applicants’ financial and demographic attributes.  Using data on 
both rejected and accepted FSA loan applications, empirical results indicate loan approval decisions 
were not significantly influenced by the borrowers’ racial class and that, in contrast to the credit risk 
assessment standards employed by commercial lenders, the collective influence of more stringent 
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Racial Minority Lending Trends at the Farm Service Agency 
 
Among private lenders, the finite supply of credit funds and their concern about borrowers’ 
credit risk profile create the need for them to adopt credit rationing schemes to protect their 
financial interests.  These lenders’ credit screening systems restrict credit access only to those with 
favorable loan credentials that satisfy the lenders’ requirements.  These credentials could include, 
among others, acceptable business and credit track records, adequate collateral coverage, and a 
more realizable, profitable and sustainable business plan.  A deficiency in any of these areas could 
be sufficient ground to deprive a potential farm borrower the chance to obtain the credit he/she 
needs from the commercial lender.  A case in point is that of a beginning farmer that lacks the 
business track record requirement and automatically faces greater odds of obtaining credit.  
Moreover, racial and gender biases arising from the subjective dimension of the lenders’ credit 
appraisal systems would only expand the list of excluded borrowers. 
Federal Lending and the Equity Principle 
The intervention of the government in the farm credit market is premised on the principle of 
equity.  The Farm Service Agency (FSA), the government’s farm retail lending arm, has been 
created to fulfill this mission by providing financial assistance to the “excluded” (underserved) farm 
borrowers that are unable to obtain commercial credit.  Aside from subsidized direct loans, the FSA 
extends credit risk mitigating-loan guarantees that facilitate the successful negotiation of loan 
transactions between commercial lenders and their farm borrowers considered as borderline cases 
under their credit risk appraisal systems.  The FSA also has developed special programs for 
beginning farmers.  It currently allocates about 10% of its annual loan funds for lending to socially 
disadvantaged borrowers that include women and minority producers.     3
FSA loans, however, are not typical “dole-out” funds that are disbursed to any farmer that 
fits the eligibility guidelines established for each special lending program.  FSA official directives 
have specifically emphasized that eligible farmers would still need to show reasonable ability to 
repay loans (FSA-USDA, November 2003).  Relative to their private counterparts, however, the 
FSA would not penalize a prospective farm borrower’s credit standing with the agency for 
delinquent credit records that could be proven to have resulted from circumstances beyond the 
farmer’s control.  Moreover, the FSA does not consider nonexistence of credit track record as 
unacceptable credit history (FSA-USDA, 1996, May 1997, September 1997).  In general, FSA 
lending programs provide serious, dedicated farmers that operate potentially viable farm businesses 
with the chance to implement their business plans, which would otherwise not have been carried 
because of the lack of financial support from regular lending channels. 
Discriminatory Lending Practices 
The equitable implementation of FSA’s lending programs, however, has been challenged in 
the last decade.  A number of African American farmers filed in 1997 a class action suit against the 
USDA for racial discrimination in farm lending and benefit programs allegedly committed from 
1981 to 1996.  After a thorough investigation, the FSA acknowledged that there have been isolated 
cases of discrimination and “under service” in the past which could not necessarily be characterized 
as “systemic discriminatory practices (p. ii, USDA, 1997).”  As a result, a five-year Consent decree 
between African American farmers and the USDA, which began in 1999, was established to 
provide a framework for the settlement of eligible (upheld) claims.   
The class lawsuit has created a significant financial burden for the USDA.  As of July 2003, 
the USDA has already mailed out about $641 million to 12,831 claimants who won their cases 
against the USDA under the less rigorous “Track A” assessment and settlement process.  USDA   4
also has forgiven these farmers’ loans amounting to about $18.5 million, in addition to $206,227 
returned to some farmers who had offsets taken to service delinquent accounts (USDA, 2003).  
Among farmers who chose to provide evidence of extreme wrongdoing under the more difficult and 
more demanding “Track B” process, 71 cases received a settlement totaling $7.2 Million while 
another group of 16 who have gone to (and prevailed in) a hearing received $5.5 Million (USDA, 
2003).  Overall, the USDA reports that 97.9% of the approved claimants have already received the 
stipulated payments as of November 2003. 
The Aftermath of the 1997 Class Action Suit 
This study re-visits this controversy by analyzing trends in the financial attributes of 
randomly selected FSA borrowers in the state of Georgia from 1999 to 2002 to discern whether loan 
decisions were made by the FSA lending officers without racial prejudice.  Notably, the time period 
used in this analysis spans after the USDA acknowledged the possibility of irregularities in previous 
loan decisions, initiated the settlement process, and apparently committed to eliminate further 
discriminatory practices in its lending programs.   
The USDA’s Status Report 
  USDA’s Notice FLP-328 is a current administrative circular notice to all FSA state and 
county offices that reminds lending offices of guidelines in “Equitable Treatment in Processing 
Loan Applications (FSA-USDA, November 17, 2003).”  The circular emphasizes the agency’s 
mission to eliminate disparate treatment of minority farmers in loan processing, ensures the timely 
processing of loan applications, and reiterates the importance of the review process for rejected and 
withdrawn direct loan applications pertaining to socially disadvantaged (SDA) farmers. 
  In its latest progress report (FSA-USDA, November 2003), the FSA claims that black 
farmers’ participation in farm loan programs have been steadily increasing with 16.64% of black   5
farmers in the country successfully obtaining loans from the FSA.  This proportion is high 
compared to 13.20% among minority farmers and 3.68% among white farmers.  Current total loans 
granted to black farmers have grown by 33% over the loan levels in 1995.  Moreover, the USDA 
claims that the average length of processing of loan applications received from black farmers is 17 
days, which is the same for all other applicants.  This rate is well within the mandated 60-day period 
given to the FSA to approve or disapprove a farm loan application. 
Empirical Design 
  An analytical framework is developed to verify the extent of the duplicity of a representative 
credit evaluation construct used by private lenders when applied to the FSA lending programs.  
Specifically, this analysis will determine the relative significance within the FSA lending 
framework of traditional credit risk measurement concepts consistent with the private lenders’ and 
the FSA’s definitions of basic “creditworthiness” vis-à-vis the FSA’s “credit delinquency” special 
exemptions provisions.  In other words, this study will verify whether or not the FSA implements a 
lending decision framework that reinforces more its “lender of last resort” role.  Specifically, this 
framework entails making loan approval decisions based largely on special considerations of 
unavoidable past credit or business conditions and the recognition of the borrowers’ potential, rather 
than, realized “creditworthiness,” in addition to perceptions of the applicant’s dedication to the 
farming business.  A greater emphasis on the use of more stringent, objective credit risk evaluation 
principles will not significantly differentiate the FSA from the private lenders, hence, such practices 
could be contradictory to its expected role as the farmers’ lender of last resort.  
  Moreover, this empirical analysis also considers the borrowers’ structural/demographic 
attributes (such as farm size, race, and gender) to determine the relative strengths of objective credit 
risk assessment criteria among separate models for certain social classes of FSA borrowers.  Subsets   6
of direct and guaranteed loan observations are also separately analyzed to discern whether or not 
distinct differences in credit risk assessment that determine loan approval decisions exist among 
direct loans evaluated by FSA loan officers and guaranteed loans that have already been previously 
screened by regular, commercial lenders. 
  The racial discrimination issue is addressed in this model through the inclusion of a racial 
class dummy variable in the general estimating equation.  Moreover, separate regression runs are 
made on two racial classes of farmer-applicants to determine inconsistencies in the application of 
credit risk assessment criteria. 
FSA Borrower Data 
  The borrower data used in this study were obtained from the FSA Georgia State office.  The 
dataset consists of 348 loan applications filed with the agency from 1999 to 2002.  Of these loan 
observations, 222 were filed under the direct lending program while 126 applied for guaranteed 
loans.  Majority of the loan applicants were white farmers, comprising 85% (297 observations) of 
the total number of loan applications. This dataset has a loan approval rate of 55% (191 
applications).    The approved loan observations were randomly selected by the FSA for verification 
that governmental procedures used in making loans were followed. On the other hand, the denied 
loan applications comprised the remaining “complete, usable” records kept by the eight FSA district 
offices in the state. A number of rejected loan applications with either very minimal or no 
information on file were discarded in this analysis.  These were allegedly applicants that have been 
immediately detected as ineligible to borrow under any of FSA’s lending programs, hence did not 
warrant further collection of information for loan processing and credit risk assessment. 
Information extracted from the loan portfolios include borrower declarations from income 
statements and balance sheets, in addition to information of the ethnic background and gender of the   7
primary borrowers.  Portfolio information taken by loan officers was verified through tax returns, 
lien searches, and credit checks. 
Econometric Framework 
A binomial logistic framework involving a dichotomous dependent variable is used to 
determine important linkages between the FSA’s decision on each loan application and the 
applicants’ financial and demographic attributes.
1 The estimating equation is defined as: 
where Y is the event of interest that takes on an ordered value of 1 if the FSA loan application is 
approved and 0 if disapproved; p is the probability of the event’s occurrence, i.e., P(Y=1); while a, 
B, X and e correspond to the intercept, the coefficient estimate(s), the explanatory variable(s) and 
the error term, respectively, which are the estimating equation’s right-hand side components 
(Greene). A total of five models are analyzed in this study, i.e. the entire farm borrower dataset and 
four subsets of data categorized according to the type of FSA credit exposure (direct versus 
guaranteed lending) and the racial class of the farmer-applicants (white versus non-white farmers).
2 
  The explanatory variables include proxy financial measures representing the recurring 
components of credit scoring models analyzed in the literature (Miller and LaDue; Turvey; Splett, et 
al.; Kohl).  These variables include: 
i)  Debt-Asset ratio representing solvency conditions; 
ii)  Return on Assets as a measure of profitability; 
iii) Net Farm Income Ratio, calculated as the ratio of net farm income to gross revenues, as a 
measure of financial efficiency; 
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v)  the Asset Turnover Ratio, calculated as the ratio of gross farm revenues to total farm assets, 
to account for asset productivity; and 
vi) the capital debt repayment margin ratio (Repayment Margin Ratio), calculated as the ratio of 
the level of net cash margin to the amount of debt servicing requirements, as a measure of 
repayment capacity. 
The regressors also include the following dummy variables created to discern whether or not 
the loan approval process is significantly influenced by demographic factors: 
i)  SIZE, which takes on a value of 1 for small farms with revenues below $250,000 and 0 
otherwise; 
ii)  NONWHITE, with a value of 1 for non-white borrowers and 0 otherwise, to capture any 
racial bias; 
iii) FEMALE, with a value of 1 for a female primary borrower and 0 otherwise, to discern 
any gender bias; and 
iv) DIRECT LOANS, which takes on a value of 1 for loans accommodated under the direct 
lending programs and 0 otherwise. 
  Additional dummy variables were also included in the model to account for differences in 
certain farming areas in the state.  Actually, the data in this analysis were obtained from eight FSA 
loan districts.  For purposes of this study, contiguous loan districts were combined based on climate 
and homogeneity of farm production profiles of certain regions.  Hence, Districts 2 and 5 were 
combined to form the CENTRAL region; Districts 3 and 4 were merged as the EAST region; 
Districts 7 and 8 now represent the SOUTH region; and District 1 was retained as the NORTH 
region.  One strategic exception was made.  District 6, though located in South Georgia, was set 
apart from the SOUTH region and designated SOUTH (D6) because of substantial differences.    9
SOUTH (D6) had a relatively high number of nonwhite borrowers – 25% relative to 6% for the 
SOUTH region.  Loan size on average was much higher in SOUTH (D6) – about 64% higher than 
for the SOUTH region.  Further, gross farm income was almost 35% higher in SOUTH (D6) than in 
SOUTH on average.  In this analysis, the excluded category among the regional dummy variables is 
the NORTH region. 
Descriptive Analysis 
  Table 1 presents the mean values of selected financial measures for the entire dataset and for 
three categories of farmer-applicants based on their loan approval status, lending program 
considered, and racial group.  T-statistics were calculated to determine significant differences 
between pairs of mean values obtained for each borrower category.   
The results indicate that approved loan applications had significantly larger gross farm 
revenues and net farm incomes than the rejected applicants.  This group also outperformed the 
denied loan applicants in all credit scoring/financial performance measures considered in this 
analysis, except for solvency.   
The summary also indicates that guaranteed farm loans are generally larger in asset, net 
worth, gross revenue, and net farm income terms.  Moreover, most financial ratios associated with 
these borrowers are more favorable than those of farms that received direct loans from the agency.  
This is a logical result considering that guaranteed borrowers have been previously screened and 
evaluated by commercial lenders before being referred for FSA guarantee.  Among other reasons, 
the guarantee requirement in these borrowers’ loan covenants with their commercial lenders could 
result from the borrowers’ deficiency in at least one financial criterion.  In this study’s sample 
observations, the guaranteed farms’ relatively weaker profitability (return on assets) position could   10
have, among other factors, negatively affected credit risk ratings and, thus, created the need for FSA 
guarantee.  
The patterns for the gross financial measures obtained for white and non-white borrowers 
mirror the direct versus guaranteed loan comparisons.  White farmer-applicants had significantly 
larger asset, net worth, gross farm revenue, and net farm income positions than their non-white 
counterparts.  However, the results for the financial ratios only indicate significant differences in net 
farm income and current ratios where white applicants had more favorable financial efficiency and 
liquidity positions than non-white applicants.  Notably, the average net farm income and current 
ratios obtained for non-white borrowers (0.1069 and 0.4498, respectively) are even lower than those 
calculated for the rejected loan dataset (0.1106 and 0.5451, respectively).   
Moreover, the results across all data groups indicate that FSA loan programs usually attract 
highly leveraged borrowers with mean debt-to-asset ratios ranging from about 0.6889 to 1.0834, or 
an overall mean solvency measure of 0.9153.  Even approved loan applications had an average 
debt-to-asset ratio of 0.7770.  Also, the overall current ratio of 1.8071 is quite below the norm of 
2.0, although approved FSA loan applications actually exceed this value at 2.84.   
Econometric Analysis 
The binomial logistic regression results obtained for the five regression models are 
summarized in Table 2.   Since logit coefficient estimates could be interpreted merely relative to the 
"log odds ratio" and do not provide any direct reference to the rate of change in values of the 
dependent variable, the marginal effect of each regressor was derived as:   11
where p is the probability of obtaining loan approval, β is the logit coefficient and f(.) is the density 
function of the cumulative probability distribution function (Greene).  The marginal effect provides 
more intuitive information on the effect of each unit change in the value of the variable on the 
probability of approval of the FSA loan application. The marginal effects of the significant 
regressors are summarized in Table 3. The results in Table 2, however, provide important 
information on the significance of certain regressors and their directional effects, in addition to the 
models’ overall explanatory power and predictive ability.   
The results of the general model that considered all loan applications indicate that only two 
credit scoring-related variables, repayment margin ratio and current ratio, had positive, significant 
influence on the dependent variable. The marginal effects reported in Table 3 indicate that a unit 
change in the repayment margin ratio increases the likelihood of loan approval by 0.43776.  This 
variable produces more sensitive impact on the dependent variable than the current ratio variable 
whose marginal effect was calculated at 0.05144. 
The results for the dummy variables in Table 2 indicate that the loan applications from male 
applicants and those filed under the guaranteed lending program are more likely to get approved.  
Moreover, farmer-applicants from the North Region are more likely to get their loan applications 
approved than those coming from the East, South, and Central regions in the state. This could be 
attributed to the stronger financial position of livestock producers in the North region compared to 
peanut, cotton and grain farms in the other areas. 
There are two compelling trends in this set of results:  the insignificance of the racial 
minority dummy variable (Non-White) and the lack of explanatory power of most credit-scoring 
related variables in determining changes in the dependent variable.  These findings indicate that in 
β β
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general there is no statistical evidence of racial discrimination in the implementation of FSA loan 
programs considered in this analysis.  Also, the insignificance of most financial measures indicates 
that in general the enforcement of special exemptions allowed by the FSA in measuring 
“creditworthiness” could have dominated the use of objective, more stringent “creditworthiness” 
criteria that resemble the commercial lenders’ rating systems.  True to its role as the “lender of last 
resort,” the decisions made by the FSA to grant credit were most likely based on the borrowers’ 
potentials to rectify any deficiencies in their credit histories and their willingness and perceived 
ability to implement viable, feasible farm business plans.  The next batch of results should shed 
more light on these two issues. 
Direct versus Guaranteed Loan Applicants 
This analysis is designed to determine any adjustments in credit risk assessment methods are 
made between the two FSA lending programs.  The results in Table 2 show that each of the direct 
and guaranteed loan models had two significant credit scoring-related variables.  The results for the 
direct loan model mirror those obtained for the general model.  The repayment margin and current 
ratios were significantly positively signed, with the repayment variable exerting more significant 
influence on the dependent variable (marginal effect of 0.32295 in Table 3) than current ratio 
(marginal effect of 0.15695 in Table 3).  The repayment variable is also a significant regressor in 
the guaranteed loan model, although its marginal effect of 0.13866 is less than the calculated 
marginal effect of 0.23360 for return on assets, the other significant regressor in the model. 
Other results indicate that larger farms are more likely to get their guaranteed loan 
applications approved while the same likelihood is greater among male borrowers in the direct 
lending program.  The results for the regional dummy variables in the both models are almost   13
similar to those obtained in the general model, except that the South region variable is insignificant 
in the guaranteed loans model. 
Again, the same trends are observed in this analysis:  the lack of significance for the racial 
minority dummy variable and most of the credit scoring-related variables. 
Non-White versus White Loan Applicants 
  As before, the rationale for this analysis is to determine whether different sets of credit risk 
assessment criteria are used for the two racial classes of loan applicants.  The summary in Table 2 
shows that each of the two racial class models produced only one significant financial variable.  
Current ratio was an important indicator of credit risk (hence a factor for loan approval decisions) 
for non-white borrowers while the repayment capacity of white borrowers was a significant 
regressor in the other model.  Moreover, larger non-white farms and male white farm operators are 
more likely to get their loan applications approved.  White farmer-applicants under the guaranteed 
lending program also are more likely to experience loan approval.  The North region borrowers 
have a greater chance of successfully obtaining an FSA loan compared to non-white farmers in the 
Central region and white farmers in the East and Central region. 
In general, most of the credit scoring-related variables again lack significant explanatory 
power, which suggests that most borrowers that eventually get their loan applications approved are 
actually able to justify certain weaknesses in their historical financial performance using the 
exemption provisions allowed by the FSA for determining credit delinquency.   
Summary and Conclusions 
  This study provides important clarification of the nature of credit risk assessment methods 
employed by FSA lending officers in making loan approval decisions.  The clear distinction 
between typical “dole-out” government subsidies and the FSA farm loans justifies the need for   14
credit risk measurement in the implementation of the latter type of government programs.  
However, even while FSA operating guidelines exist for the evaluation of basic “creditworthiness” 
that more or less resemble the commercial lenders’ risk rating systems, certain exemptions are 
allowed for special reasonable circumstances (which are normally sufficient grounds for loan 
denials by private lenders) that undermine a farmer’s chances at obtaining farm loans.  The results 
of this analysis indicate that the collective influence of more stringent and objective credit scoring 
measures on loan approval decisions is insignificant and could be possibly dominated by special 
considerations allowed by the FSA in measuring credit risk.  Regardless of the loan applicant’s 
racial class (white versus non-white farmers), or whether the loan application is filed under the 
direct or guaranteed lending program of the FSA, this study’s evidence reaffirms the FSA’s primary 
role as the lender of last resort in recent years for farmers in Georgia who have experienced 
hardships but possibly with good potentials to rebuild their farm businesses and implement remedial 
plans designed to build more acceptable credit and business track records. 
  This analysis also does not produce any evidence of racial discrimination in the 
implementation of FSA loan programs.  The non-white farmer-applicants in this study, which had 
significantly smaller farm operations, more inferior liquidity and financial efficiency positions than 
their white farmer-counterparts, had as much chance as any other borrower in obtaining an FSA 
loan accommodation. 
  Overall, the FSA appears to be carrying out its mission. Some of the operations serviced by 
the FSA are in poor financial condition but apparently have a reasonable chance of succeeding.  
Loan applicants are not subjected to a litmus test where financial ratios must exceed certain 
thresholds.  As long as the operation displays sufficient cash flow and repayment ability, the FSA is 
inclined to service the loan.       15
  This study, however, is limited in coverage to FSA borrowers in Georgia, which has distinct 
demographic attributes.  Moreover, there was no information available on the amount of the loan 
requested by the farmers who eventually received FSA financial assistance.  The amount of the loan 
requested would allow one to determine whether the accusations made by some non-white farmers 
that they receive less funds than requested is unfounded or not.  Moreover, the discrimination issue 
could have been pursued further with the investigation of gender bias in this analysis.  
Unfortunately, this dataset has very few observations pertaining to female “minority” loan 
applicants. 
  Nonetheless, this research provides a good starting point for a more systematic, verification 
of FSA’s lending practices by incorporating credit assessment principles in a more appropriate 
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Notes: 
1.  A cross-sectional regression approach is used in this analysis considering that the loan 
observations in each of the 4 year-period are unique and non-recurring in other years.   
2.   Separate analyses of borrowers belonging to gender classes could not be made given the small 
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Table 1.   Mean Values and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) of Selected Financial Measures, 1999-2002 
 
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant differences of pairs of means at the 99%, 95%, and 90% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
Application Status  Race  Lending Program  Financial Variables ($)  Entire 
Sample  Denied   Approved  White  Non-White  Guaranteed  Direct 



























































































































































































No. of Observations  348  157 191 297 51  126 222  20
Table 2.  Logistic regression results, Georgia FSA Loan Application Dataset, 1999-2002 
 
By Lending Program Type  By Race   
Variables 
All Loan 
Applications  Direct Loans  Guaranteed Loans Non-White  White 











A.  Credit Scoring-Related Variables 






























































































































































Log Likelihood  -158.70768  -103.47890 -36.26986 -10.69891 -134.09321







2 0.3375  0.3197 0.4741 0.6450 0.3376
Number of Observations  348  222 118 47 297
Correct Predictions (%)  80.75  78.83 88.98 91.49 81.48
Notes:  
a,b,c Denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
* This dummy variable was dropped from the estimating equation for non-white and guaranteed 
loan applicants since "d6=0 predicts success perfectly." 
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Table 3.  Marginal Effects of Significant Regressors 
 
By Lending Program Type  By Race   
Variables 
All Loan 
Applications  Direct Loans  Guaranteed Loans  Non-White  White 
A.  Credit Scoring-Related Variables 
Return on Assets    0.23360
Repayment Margin Ratio  0.43776  0.32295 0.13866 0.48134
Current Ratio  0.05144  0.15695 1.07809
B.  Demographic/Structural and FSA Regional Dummy Variables 
Size   -0.04693 -0.51145
Female -0.36516  -0.40216 -0.63415
Direct Loans  -0.12508  -0.11912
East Region  -0.42038  -0.40530 -0.13782 -0.33603
South Region  -0.37232  -0.39419
Central Region  -0.62084  -0.72602 -0.15429 -0.91702 -0.54690
 